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COMMENTS
MOORE V. REGENTS OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA:
NOW THAT THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAS
SPOKEN, WHAT HAS IT REALLY SAID?'
In October, 1976, John Moore was treated for hairy-cell
leukemia' at the University of California at Los Angeles Medical
Center ("UCLA").2

Dr. David Golde, a physician-researcher,

confirmed the diagnosis by laboratory tests performed on blood and
other fluid samples taken from Moore? Moore's treatment for this
disease included the surgical removal of his spleen, which later
became the subject of laboratory investigations by Golde and his
associates.4 The scientists subsequently developed and patented a
cell line' derived from cells that originated in Moore's spleen.6 The

Regents of the University of California 7 assisted Golde in licensing

The author thanks Mr. Gerry Elman, J.D., for furnishing a pre-publication
version of the BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW REPORT symposium dealing with the Moore
case, and Mr. Richard Godown of the Industrial Biotechnology Association for
providing a copy of the Amicus Curiae brief.
Hairy cell leukemia is the cancerous overgrowth of a particular class of white
blood cells called lymphocytes. These cells have an abnormal appearance,
characterized by the presence of numerous projections from the cell surface. The
name "hairy-cell" leukemia is derived from the microscopic appearance of the
lymphocytes. See Daniel Catovsky et al., Leukemic Reticuloendotheliosis ("hairy" cell
leukemia): A Distinct Clinico-PathologicalEntity, 26 BRIT. J. HEMATOLOGY, 9 (1974).
See also CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 998-1001 U.B. Wyngaarden & L.H. Smith eds.,
1988).
2 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
3id.
4 Id.

' A cell line is a sample of cells that has become adapted to growth in
laboratory conditions and has become capable of continuous and indefinite growth.
U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF TISSUES AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337
32-35 (1987) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
6 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82.
7
The Regents of the University of California is the governing body of the

University. Id.
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the rights to the cell line and the biological products that it
produced.' Subsequently, Golde and the Regents received large
sums of money from the two companies that had received a license.9
By 1983, Moore became aware of the commercial use that had
derived from his spleen cells, and filed suit against Golde, Quan (an
assistant of Golde), the Regents, and the two companies, seeking
damages for conversion, declaratory relief and other causes of
action.1" The California Superior Court granted the defendants'
demurrer to the allegations;, however, the California Court of
Appeal reversed and held that Moore did have a cause of action
against the defendants for conversion. 2
The California Supreme Court decided that Moore's
complaint stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty by the
physician because of the lack of informed consent when soliciting
Moore's consent to the splenectomy."3 The court held that Moore
did not have a cause of action for conversion, thereby reversing the
appellate decision. 4 The case was remanded to the trial court for a
hearing on the issue of breach of fiduciary duty, and for a hearing
and determination of the defendants' remaining demurrers."5
This case has.been followed intensely by the biotechnology
and pharmaceutical industries because they are directly affected by
' Id. at 482.
9Id.
" Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498-99 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988), modified, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S Ct. 1388 (1991).
The causes of action alleged were:
(1) conversion, (2) lack of informed consent, (3) breach of
fiduciary duty, (4) fraud and deceit, (5) unjust enrichment, (6)
quasi-contract, (7) breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair-dealing, (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (9)
negligent misrepresentation, (10) interference with prospective
advantageous economic relationships, (11) slander of title, (12)
accounting, and (13) declaratory relief.
Id.
nId. at 502.
12 Id. at 494.

"Id. at 497. This involved informed consent for two different procedures, one
for the surgical removal of the spleen, the other for Moore's consent to allow the
physicians to use the spleen for their research studies. See infra notes 106-22 and
accompanying text.
" Moore, 793 P.2d at 497.
15Id.
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the outcome of the decision. 6 Many products that are currently in
development have originated in tissue or other samples originally
obtained from patients during the course of medical treatment. 7 If
on remand the trial court determines that defendant Golde breached
his fiduciary duty to Moore when obtaining Moore's consent to use
the spleen for research, its decision will force others, both physicians
and possibly even non-medical personnel, to be more rigorous in
seeking consent for using removed tissue for research.
The California Supreme Court has eliminated the cause of
action for conversion, 8 thereby denying Moore a property right to
his tissue. 9 If on appeal the court later rules that a patient has a
property right to his or her tissue that becomes developed into a
commercially viable and valuable product, it may drastically effect
biomedical research. For example, if Moore is awarded damages as
a share of the gross sales for the products that were developed, it
will add what could be a substantial cost to product development.
It may also have a chilling effect on medical research where patients
may prefer to see their tissue destroyed after its removal rather than
donated where it may potentially become a commercial product. A
worse scenario is that the prospect for financial gain might create a
situation where patients delay, or even fail to obtain treatment for
serious illness while shopping around for the best deal on their
tissue. The implications of this decision will also effect other
medical-legal areas such as fetal research or organ transplantation.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the issues of the
Moore v. Regents of the University of California' case and its impact
on the scientific community. The Comment will discuss the various
opinions and the court's rationale in determining that an individual
does not have a property right to their tissues. This Comment will
then focus on the effect of the decision on the biotechnology
industry. The California Supreme Court stated, in effect, that it was
ruling in favor of the biotechnology industry by taking a pragmatic
16 See Marcia

Barinaga, A Muted Victoryfor the Biotech Industry, 249 SCIENcE 239

(1990).
'7

See OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 52-59.

18In

California, conversion is a strict liability tort. Therefore, good faith, lack
of knowledge, and motives of those who acquire the property are irrelevant. City
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 149 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978).
19Moore, 793 P.2d at 497.

' 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
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The weaknesses of the majority decision are

highlighted by the dissenting opinions. The Comment will address
how the California Supreme Court decision illustrates the weaknesses
of the current Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.' The Comment will
conclude with the recommendation that federal legislation should be
enacted in order to resolve this problem on a national basis, since
common law has the potential to create a patchwork of remedies that
may prove unsuitable to all parties.

I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOORE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
Biotechnology refers to a collection of both new and old
laboratory techniques that have resulted from developments in
bacterial genetics and immunology during the 1970s.'
The
biotechnology industry encompasses a variety of businesses
representing agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, medical
diagnostics, oil and chemical companies, and the newer
biotechnology companies.' In 1973, scientists reported how they
21

UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT,8A U.L.A. 2 (1990) [hereinafter U.A.G.A.]. The

U.A.G.A. was first enacted in 1968 to facilitate obtaining human organs for
transplantation, and has been adopted in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia. Id. at 28 The U.A.G.A. was amended in 1987 to protect organizations
that are involved in organ procurement, and to facilitate further the obtaining of
organs for transplantation. Id. at 2-4. California has adopted the U.A.G.A. and its
1987 amendments. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7157 (West 1990).
' Biotechnology can be defined as "[ain engineering discipline which develops
the methods for carrying out microbial and biochemical processes on an industrial
scale." See MARY BREWER & THOMAS Scorr, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOCHEMISTR 59 (1983) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]. The older methods include
fermentation to produce large quantities of microbial end products, such as
alcoholic beverages, antibiotics, or commercial solvents. The newer methods
include, for example, culturing of mammalian cells, genetic manipulations and the
large scale isolation and production of biologically active compounds produced by
recombinant organisms. Id. at 224-25. For information concerning the newer
techniques of genetic manipulation and monoclonal antibodies, see infra text
accompanying notes 22-34.
' OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. See also 1991 Genetic EngineeringNews Guide
to Biotechnology Companies, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 17
[hereinafter Biotechnology Guide] (listing over 750 companies utilizing biotechnology
methods for product development in diverse areas ranging from toxic waste
processing to development of human pharmaceuticals). Many biotechnology
companies were originated when university-based researchers formed corporations
to commercialize products that they developed from their research. OTA REPORT,
supra note 5, at 61-62.
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were able to cleave bacterial deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) at specific
regions using an enzyme," and then recombine the DNA from one
type of bacterium with DNA from another type, establishing the
basic protocol for what is now recombinant DNA.' One can thus
employ recombinant DNA methodology to create an organism that
will produce one or more specific products, depending upon the
genes that are present on the enzyme-treated DNA and the host
bacterium into which it was inserted.'
Other experiments involving the fusion of cells from a tumor
cell line with lymphocytes' that were producing antibodies led to
the development of cell lines that produced monoclonal
antibodies.' The advantage of the monoclonal antibody technique
over conventional methods' was that the cell line produced only
24

Enzymes are proteins that serve as catalysts for chemical reactions in most
organisms. While there are many types of enzymes, enzymes are characterized by
their specificity of reaction. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, at 140-43. Enzymes
called restriction nucleases degrade DNA at specific regions. Depending upon the
enzyme chosen, different DNAs can be mixed and recombined (with or without
another enzyme called a ligase) to form a recombinant DNA molecule. See Richard'
Roberts, Directory of Restriction Endonucleases, 68 METHoDS IN ENZYMOLOGY 27
(1979).
' Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction of BiologicallyFunctionalPlasmids In Vitro,

70 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 3240 (1973).
2

Id.
' Lymphocytes are white blood cells that play a central role in the immune
response when an organism responds to a foreign particle, called an antigen.
Lymphocytes are of two classes, determined by the organ of the body from which
they originated. T-cells are lymphocytes that originated in the thymus gland, while
B-cells originated in bone marrow. Under certain conditions many lymphocytes
produce a variety of proteins called lymphokines, which have various biological
activities. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, at 257. The cell line obtained from Moore's
spleen was a good producer of lymphokines. See infra text accompanying note 38.
Antigens are defined as substances that induce an immune response and the
production of an antibody. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 22, at 35-36. Antibodies
belong to the class of proteins called immunoglobulins that are produced in
response to an antigen. Id. at 217-23.
'See George Kohler & Cesar Milstein, Continuous Cultures of Fused Cells
Secreting Antibody of Predefined Specificity, 256 NATURE 495 (1975).
2 Conventional methods of preparing antibodies to bacteria or cancerous cells
consisted of injecting laboratory animals with the antigen over a period of time,
and then obtaining serum from the animal. Since serum is a mixture of many
antibodies, it had to be purified extensively for use in many studies. See
Introduction: Monoclonal Antibodies against Bacteriafor Medicine, Dentistry, Veterinary
Sciences, Biotechnology and Industry-An Overview, 1 MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES
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one specific antibody, thus facilitating the antibody's isolation and
purification." Numerous diagnostic, pharmaceutic, and therapeutic
products have been developed utilizing these two techniques.3
Many of these potential therapeutic agents, such as several colonystimulating factors32 and erythropoietins' are still in clinical
trials.'
Several interferons have been developed to treat viral
infections, including one that is in clinical trials for Acquired
Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and AIDS-Related Complex.'
The market for these products has been estimated to be in the
billions of dollars.' Many of these products originated from tissue
or cell samples that were originally obtained from patients during the
course of medical treatment for various disorders.37 The "Mo" cell
line that was derived from Moore's spleen cells produces several of
these factors.' Moore raises the issue of whether a patient whose
AGAINST BACTERIA

xvii (Alberto J. L. Macario & Everly Conway de Macario eds.,

1985).
' Id. at xvii-xx.
31See Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in
Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 628 (1989).
"Immune system enhancers. Id. at 629. See Biotechnology Therapeutics in
Development, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 1990, at 34 [hereinafter Therapeutics]
(compiling products that are in various stages of development, clinical testing, and
products currently on the market).
"Erythropoietins stimulate production of red blood cells and are potentially
useful for the treatment of anemias. Therapeutics,supra note 32, at 34.
' Id. Recently, the Food and Drug Administration authorized Immunex
Corporation to market a Granulocyte Macrophage-Colony Stimulating Factor (GMCSF) to aid cancer patients who have had bone marrow transplants. Lawrence M.
Fisher, New Immunex Drug Wins U.S. Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,1991, at D4.
's Therapeutics, supra note 32, at 35.
See OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 56-62.
3'Id. at 8.
' See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 517-30
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988), modified, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388
(1991) (copy of United States Patent 4,438,032 describing the "Mo" cell line and the
various products that it produces issued to Golde and Quan as inventors and
assigned to Regents). These products include immune interferons, granulocytemacrophage colony-stimulating factor, and erythroid-potentiating activity. Id. at
517. These products are similar to the various factors described previously. See
supra text accompanying notes 30-31. See also Therapeutics, supra note 32, at 34.
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tissue was later commercialized should share in the profits.39 The
OTA Report, however, stresses that "the probability that any one
person's biological materials will be developed into a valuable
product is exceedingly small. Thus, the issue of great potential
commercial gain from donated materials is relevant to a small
minority of sources."' The number of patent applications filed that
dealt with biologicals did increase over 300 percent during the period
between 1980-1984,"' compared to the previous five year period
after the patent laws were modified in 1980 to encourage patenting
of materials developed with government funds' and the Supreme
Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.' The "Mo" cell line
established by Golde and his co-workers was an overproducer of
certain lymphokines which had potential anticancer activity, if these
products could be successfully commercialized."

Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479,480 (Cal.1990),

cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
' OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (emphasis supplied). Approximately 49% of
the researchers surveyed in the OTA Report stated they used human tissues or
fluids in their research. Id.
41Id. at 7.
2 Id.
' 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (allowing patenting of novel life forms, provided they
were developed by man and were not naturally occurring).
" See infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
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II. MOORE V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
A. Factual Setting
In 1976, John Moore was a worker on the Alaskan pipeline
who had been suffering from fatigue and susceptibility to easy
bruising over a two year period.' He was first treated at the UCLA
Medical Center in October, 1976, where he was subsequently
diagnosed as having hairy-cell leukemia. ' Dr. David Golde, later
named as one of the defendants in the suit, confirmed a diagnosis of
hairy-cell leukemia based upon laboratory tests performed on
samples of Moore's blood, bone marrow, and "other bodily
substances."47 Moore's complaint alleges that when defendant
Golde had Moore's fluids sampled for diagnosis, Golde knew that
certain blood products could have significant commercial and
scientific value.' The complaint further alleges that Golde could
obtain both a commercial and scientific competitive advantage by
having access to a patient whose fluids produced these substances.49
Three days after Moore's initial visit, Golde recommended
that Moore's spleen be removed as part of the normal course of
treatment for this type of leukemia so and advised that the surgery
was medically necessary to slow the progress of the disease.5 1
Moore consented to the surgery based upon Golde's
representations, 2 and shortly thereafter surgeons at UCLA removed

45 George J. Annas, Whose Waste is it Anyway? The Case of John Moore, 18
HASTINcS CENTER REP. 37 (Oct.-Nov. 1988) [hereinafter Annas, Waste]. See Moore,
793 P.2d at 490. Justice Panelli, writing for the majority, stated that the court is still
reviewing a demurrer, and that there has been no finding of fact in the case. Thus,
the "facts" are still allegations, but for purposes of the court's opinion, and this
Comment, they will be accepted as true. Id. See supra note 1, for a description of
hairy-cell leukemia.
"Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479,481 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
47id.

4Id.

49id.

10 Id. See CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 1036-39. A
splenectonomy is routinely performed during the treatment of hairy-cell leukemia.
Approximately eighty-five percent of the treated patients recover. Id. at 1038.
51 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. The complaint stated that Golde told Moore "he had
reason to fear for his life. ..." Id.
52 Id.
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Moore's spleen.' The complaint further stated that Golde and his
assistant, Shirley Quan,' had planned to obtain samples of the
spleen after its removal and take these samples to a research
laboratory.' The California Supreme Court stated that Golde had
written directions to this effect two days prior to Moore's
splenectomy,' but that Golde and Quan's research activities were
not to have any relationship to Golde's treatment of Moore's medical
problem. 7 Apparently, since Moore was suffering less than most
patients with hairy-cell leukemia, Golde wanted to see if there was
anything unusual about Moore's spleen cells.'
Technicians in
Golde's research laboratory had established a cell line from the
spleen cells by August, 1979.
The "Mo" cell line was an
SId.
Shirley Quan was a laboratory assistant of Dr. Golde, and was also named
as a defendant. Id.
s Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
s Id. The pleadings indicate that Moore was unaware of Golde's plans to study
Moore's spleen cells as a part of Golde's research. Id. at 483.
571d.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-27179.5 (West 1984)
(concerning experimentation on humans). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24173 (West 1984) (regarding informed consent). The provision contained in
§ 24173(c)(7) provides that the patient has the choice to consent to (or refuse)
experimental treatment, and that a decision either way will not prejudice the
patient's treatment. Section (e) states that "consent is voluntary... by the human
subject... without the intervention of... fraud, deceit ... or undue influence." Id.
(emphasis added). These statutes were modeled after the United States Department
of Health and Human Services regulations on Protection of Human Subjects. See
46 C.F.R. §§ 46.10146.909 (1989) (providing that a state or local government can
enact informed consent requirements which are more stringent than those
mandated by the federal government).
' See Tanya Wells, The Implications of a Property Right in One's Body, 30
JURIMETRICS J. 371, 371-72 (1990).

" The cell line established was named after Moore, and was thus designated as
the "Mo" cell line. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82. See OTA REPORT, supra note 5, for
basic methods of establishing cell lines. Cancerous (tumor) cells are easier to
establish into cell lines than are normal (healthy) cells, which tend to die out after
a few weeks in culture. Tumor cell lines, on the other hand, are immortal, and can
be maintained indefinitely in the laboratory. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488 n.15. The
majority notes that some tumor cell lines have been maintained continuously since
1951. See also Andrew Saxon et al., Immunologic Characterization of Hairy Cell
Leukemias in Continuous Culture, 120 J. IMMUNOLOGY 777 (1978) (describing
development and properties of "Mo" cell line); Andrew Saxon et al., T-Lymphocyte
Variant of Hairy-cell Leukemia, 88 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 323 (1978)
(reiterating John Moore's entire case history without using his name and including
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overproducer of certain lymphokines, and this made the cell line
valuable.'
Moore recovered from the surgery, and from November, 1976
through September, 1983 traveled from his home in Seattle,
Washington, to UCLA for follow-up care by Golde.6 Justice
Panelli's opinion for the Supreme Court of California, stated that this
was done because Moore was told that "[tihe procedures [could only
be] performed ...

'
there and only under Golde's direction."62
At

each visit, samples of sperm, blood, skin, and bone marrow were
taken by Golde. 6 Moore stated in an interview that he had no idea
that anything was done with his spleen, let alone that it 64had been
developed into a cell line that was the subject of a patent.
The complaint alleged that Golde discussed the potential
patentability of the cell line with the University in 1979.' The
Regents filed a United States patent application in 1983, issued in
1984, 66 and then licensed to Genetics Institute, Inc., a biotechnology
company from Cambridge, Massachusetts.67
The exclusive
agreement between Genetics Institute and the Regents provided that
Golde would become a paid consultant to the company and would
receive the rights to 75,000 shares of Genetics Institute common
stock.' Further, Genetics Institute would provide what appears to
be a three year research grant to Golde and the Regents for at least
$440,000, which would also cover a share of Golde's salary and
laboratory findings).
6 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481 n.2, 490 n.29. When a cell line overproduces a product,
it is producing it in a much greater quantity than normal, and this facilitates the
isolation of the product from the complex mixture of cell and growth medium

components. The "Mo" cell line was infected with a leukemia virus, which caused
the cell line to be an overproducer of lymphokines. Id. at 490 n.30. See Irving S.
Chen et al., Human T-cell Leukemia Virus Type II Transforms Normal Human
Lymphocytes, 80 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 7006 (1983).
61Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.

Id.
63Id.
62

"Annas,

Waste, supra note 45, at 37 (quoting Judith Stone, Cells for Sale,

DISCOVER 34-35 (Aug. 1988)).
6 Id. at 37.

For details regarding the patent, see supra note 38.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
Id. Later commentaries have suggested that the value of the Genetics
Institute stock given to Golde was eventually worth approximately $3,000,000. See
Barinaga, supra note 16, at 239.
6Id.

67
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benefits.' In exchange, Genetics Institute would receive exclusive
access to the work done involving the "Mo" cell line, and any
products that may be derived from it." The Regents added Sandoz
to the agreement in 1982 in exchange for $110,000 to Golde and the
Regents.'
How Moore became aware of the commercialiiation of his
spleen cells is not clear. Golde presented Moore with a consent form
in April, 1983 to allow them to use his samples for research, and
Moore signed it, although he was allegedly unaware of its
ramifications.'
One commentator states that Moore received a
telephone call in September, 1983 from Golde to the effect that Moore
did not properly sign a consent form, having circled "I 'do not'
instead of I 'do' grant the University all rights in 'any cell line."'"
Within a year of that telephone conversation, Moore initiated the suit
against the University of California, Dr. Golde, Quan, a laboratory
associate of Golde, the Genetics Institute, Inc., and Sandoz, Inc.74

Moore, 793 P.2d at 482. See Barinaga, supra note 16, at 239.
oSee supra note 38 for some of the products produced by the cell line.
7' Moore, 793 P.2d at 482. The majority opinion did not specify whether Sandoz
contributed funds for a period of one year or longer. Regardless, Golde and the
Regents clearly benefitted from licensing the cell line derived from Moore's spleen
cells. Id.
7'
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500-01 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988), modified, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
Arinas, Waste, supra note 45, at 37. See also Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 501 (copy
of consent form Moore signed on September 20, 1983, denying Golde and the
Regents "rights... in any cell line or any other potential product which might be
developed from the blood ...obtained from me.").

7"Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
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B. Causes of Action
The complaint alleged thirteen causes of action.75 The
primary causes of action addressed by the courts were those for
conversion, lack of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary duty.7 6
After hearing the pleadings, the trial court sustained the demurrers
of defendants Golde, Quan, and the Regents on all the causes of
action, with leave to amend.'
The court reasoned that since
Moore's other causes of action were based on conversion, resolution
of the conversion issue would resolve them all. 8 The court
sustained all the demurrers since the allegations pleaded were not
sufficient to support a cause of action for conversion.7
C. California Court of Appeal
Writing for the majority of the California Court of Appeal,
Justice Rothman stated that this- was a case of first impression.' He
noted that the case involved basic issues of a patient's right to control
his or her own body and whether commercial exploitation of patient
materials by health care providers will give rise to a cause of action
for damages."1
The opinion noted that any decision involving the body as
property had to be treated cautiously, in view of the "evolution of
civilization from slavery to freedom, from regarding people as
chattels to recognition of the ...dignity of each person.... . 82 The
Id. at 498.
Id. See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California,. 793 P.2d 479, 480
(Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). See supra note 10, for a description
7

76

of the remaining causes of action.
7Moore, 249

Cal. Rptr. at 498-502.

73Id. at

501.
"Id. at 501-02. The demurrers were sustained because of defects in the
pleadings. Moore did not "specifically allege that when he first went to UCLA he

did not know or have reason to know that tissue removed during the care and
treatment of patients... might be used for medical or scientific study as well as
for diagnosis and treatment of the patient." Id.

8oid. at 498.
81 Id.

82Id. at 504. Compare Moore, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 720,.with Moore, 793 P.2d at
480-98 (California Supreme Court's majority opinion ignored many of the policy
and legal issues which were raised by the appellate division). But see Justice
Mosk's dissent in the supreme court opinion, following many of the arguments
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present case left the court to decide only who should share in the
proceeds of what the majority characterized as a fait accompli.' The
majority stated that any policy considerations in the future should be
resolved by the legislature."
The primary issue before the court was whether Moore had
pleaded a cause of action for conversion, since it formed the basis for
all of the other causes of action alleged in the complaint.' Moore's
allegations that his tissues, spleen, blood, and the cell-line that the
defendants derived from his cells were "his tangible personal
M formed the crux of the complaint for conversion.7
property""
Reciting sections from the California Civil Code and case law, the
court determined that a person has rights of dominion over his or
her body; such rights are similar to property rights, thereby giving
Moore the basis for a cause of action for conversion.'M Furthermore,
the court distinguished the statutory limitations placed on the
disposal of dead bodies and the underlying public health concerns
from its view of the body as property.8 The opinion notes that the
made by the appellate division majority opinion. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506-23
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
Id.The dissent agreed with this point. Id. at 540 (George, J., dissenting).
The court of appeal's majority opinion served as the basis for the dissenting opinion
in the supreme court's decision. See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
B Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
, Id. at 503.
8 Id.

' Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. There are no property rights to dead bodies.
Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 127 Cal. Rptr. 80, 85 (1976). There is however, a quasiproperty right, but only for the limited purpose of determining custody for burial.
Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, 41 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1964). But since body parts from
decedents for use in transplantation are not free for the taking, the majority, by
necessity, inferred that a property to control usage exists regarding one's human
body. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
" Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505. See infra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
This opinion is directly opposite to the basis for California Supreme Court majority
opinion, and was based upon CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (West 1990) (defining
property), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24172-75 (West 1990) (regarding
informed consent and human experimentation), and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7150 (West 1990) (California's version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act). Many
states, including California, New Jersey and New York, have adopted the 1987
amendments to the U.A.G.A. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-57 (West
1990).

Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:6-57-65
§§ 4300-08 (McKinney 1991).

HEALTH LAW

(West Supp. 1990) with N.Y. PUB.
The New York statute includes a
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"defendants' position that plaintiff cannot own his tissue, but that
they [researchers] can, is fraught with irony."'
Another issue relating to conversion is whether Moore
abandoned his tissues, and if so, whether Golde was then free to use
them.9 The court stated that under California law, a patient's
normal expectation following surgery is that the removed tissue will
be examined and disposed of in accordance with statutes; these
expectations do not anticipate subsequent use of the tissue.' The
opinion stresses that in cases involving recombinant DNA technology
any inference of abandonment of tissue by a patient is inappropriate
because of the potential for abuse and other moral, religious and
ethical objections.'
The appellate court ruled that Moore had
adequately stated a cause of action for conversion in his complaint
and remanded the case for trial on all the remaining causes of
action."
Justice George dissented from the appellate decision
opinion. 9 The dissent stated that the legislature should do the
balancing necessary to protect the competing interests of "the patient,
the health care provider, the commercial research laboratory, and the
public at large in the removal and transfer of human bodily
provision explicitly banning the sale of organs for transplantation. N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4607 (McKinney 1991). This provision is not present in either the
New Jersey or California statutes. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2713(f) (1990)
(donor not to receive any compensation or other item of value in exchange for
donating body or parts thereof after death). The California Supreme Court Justices
disagreed on the interpretation of several sections of the California version of the
U.A.G.A. and public policy regarding the body as property in Moore. See infra
notes 123-48, 179-208 and accompanying text.
'o Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
9 Id. at 507.
9

2Id.

"' Id. at 509-10 (emphasis added). The court seemed to be focusing on the
fundamental rights of the individual, and the tone of the majority's opinion
indicates this concern with protecting the individual from exploitation by
commercial interests. The opinion cited commentators who have stated that
biotechnology is a field where the goals no longer are purely academic or the
betterment of humanity; profit is also a goal. The majority saw no reason to justify
excluding the patient from a share of the profits if biotechnology has in fact become
science for profit. Id. at 510.
" Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 510. The remaining causes of action were remanded
for a trial on the merits, since many issues, such as intent to abandon tissue were
factual. Id. at 499.
"Id. at 533 (George, J., dissenting).
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substances for research and commercial use."96 The dissent would
not grant a cause of action for conversion because the body should
not be considered property as a matter of policy.97 Justice George
cited sections of the Health and Safety Code to indicate that there is
no explicit requirement that a physician disclose any commercial use
that may derive from experimental use of human tissue.'
The
defendants appealed the court of appeal's reversal.9
D. California Supreme Court Decision

The California Supreme Court reversed the California Court
of Appeal's decision that granted Moore a property right to his
tissue." The supreme court majority determined that Moore had
stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty by the
physician"m but that there was no cause of action for
conversion."° The opinions in the Moore case represent the tension
that now characterizes the California Supreme Court." The theme
6 Id.

Id. at 537-40 (George, J., dissenting).
Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 536. The California health law deals with informed
consent to experimentation on human subjects. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§

24171-72 (West 1984). The dissent noted that these statutes were not enacted in
California until 1978, two years after Moore's splenectomy. Section 24171 states
that medical experimentation is "vital for the benefit of mankind," and expressed
the state's concern for the rights of the subjects involved. Id. While the statute is
silent on commercialization of the products or materials being tested, it is implicit
that a great deal of human experimentation is done for commercial purposes, such
as testing the efficacy of a new drug. See id. at §§ 24172-75. Justice George
interpreted the statutes strictly, observing that although they are directed towards
informed consent, "[s]ignificantly, the advisement and consent required by the Act
do not include any mention of the commercial use which might ensue from
experimental research.... ." Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (George, J., dissenting).
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
10 Id.

InId.
'o Id. The majority determined that since Moore did not have a property right
to the tissue that was removed, he did not have any basis to sustain a cause of
action for conversion, which is the wrongful taking of property. See id. at 487-98.
" See Bill Blum, Toward a Radical Middle, Has a Great Court Become Mediocre?
A.B.A.J., Jan. 1991, at 48. Blum comments on the changes that have occurred in the
California Supreme Court since a 1986 election that unseated three Justices,
including the former Chief Justice. Blum also discusses how the court was an
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common to all of the opinions in Moore is that the legislature should
resolve the questions of property rights to tissue, and the policy
issues involved."°
Another commentator has stated that the
Justices were blinded by the defendants' scientific arguments; and
further, that by dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action for
conversion, the court avoided having to resolve the novel questions
of law presented.S
1. Majority Opinion: Breach of Fiduciary Duty. - Justice Panelli, writing

for the majority, ruled that Moore's complaint stated a cause of action
for a breach of fiduciary duty by the physician, Dr. Golde. 6 The
decision was based on three principles of informed consent: the
ability of a person of sound mind and body to determine whether to
submit to lawful medical treatment, that the patient's consent must
be informed in order to be considered effective, and that a physician
is under a fiduciary duty to disclose all information that is material
to the patient's decision."° The majority opinion concluded that:
A physician must disclose personal interests
unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or
economic, that may affect the physician's professional
judgment; and ...

a physician's failure to disclose

such interests may give rise to a cause of action for
performing medical procedures without informed
activist court since the 1940s, making many inroads by establishing new areas of

tort law. Id. at 48-49. Justices Broussard and Mosk, who wrote the concurring and
dissenting opinion, and the dissent, respectively, in Moore, are the only Justices
presently on the court remaining from that activist era. See id. at 48-51. This
tension and perhaps, a lament by Justices Broussard and Mosk for their activist
days, is an undercurrent present in the Moore decision. See generally Moore, 793
P.2d at 498-507 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 507-23
(Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 156-211.
'o' See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 536 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (George, J., dissenting) (suggesting this same course of action), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). See also Moore, 793 P.2d at 479; Blum, supra note 103.
. See George Annas, Outrageous Fortune: Selling Other People's Cells, 20
HASTINcS CENTER REPORT 36-39 (Nov. & Dec. 1990) [hereinafter Annas, Selling

Cells]. The Industrial Biotechnology Association filed an amicus curiae brief on
behalf of the defendants in Moore which influenced the majority opinion. Moore,
793 P.2d at 480-97. See also Brief for Amicus Curiae, Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (No. S006987) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
" Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
107 Id.
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consent or breach of fiduciary duty."°

The majority opinion was based on both case law"°9 and
statutes 0 that could be interpreted to conclude that a reasonable
person would in fact want to know if his or her physician had an
outside economic interest which might affect their professional
judgment."' The underlying policy concern was one of public
trust; the court wanted to ensure patients that any treatment
performed would be directly related to their medical care and not2
expose them to any treatment that would have no direct benefit."
The majority held that the physician has a fiduciary duty to the
patient when seeking consent for a medical procedure." Further,
the physician must disclose personal interests which are unrelated to
the patient's health, that may affect the physician's judgment, in
108 Id.

" Id. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) (establishing negligence
theory of informed consent). The Cobbs court held that the choices have to be
presented to the patient, including the dangers that might be associated with them.
Id. at 10. The patient should be given the choice to decide what is material to their
treatment. Id. at 11. The court did allow a physician an "out" for nondisclosure.
This required the physician to, prove that he "relied on facts which would
demonstrate to a reasonable man the disclosure would have so seriously upset the
patient that the patient would not have been able to dispassionately weight the
risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment." Id. at 12. See also
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body... ."); Magan Med. Clinic v. California State Bd. of
Med. Examiners, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (upholding state statute
that prohibited medical partnerships from owning pharmacies due to conflicts of
interest, but allowing physicians to own stock in pharmaceutical corporations).
110California law requires a physician seeking to perform experiments using
human beings to disclose the sponsorship of the research and the physician's
interest in the research to the patient. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173 (West
1990). See also Moore, 793 P.2d at 484. The court noted that it need not decide the
issue, since the trial court did not address whether Golde violated this section of
the code. Id. at 484 n.7. California adopted CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 2417024179.5 (West 1984), entitled "Human Experimentation," to allow medical
experimentation on human beings, but at the same time, protect individuals from
risks associated with unnecessary, risky, or negligently performed experiments. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24171 (West 1990); see also supra note 99.
..Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
112Id. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24171-24172 (West 1990).
"' Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.
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order to have truly obtained the patient's informed consent.1 This
includes the physician's economic or research interests."' The
court determined that Golde violated his fiduciary duty when he
obtained Moore's consent to surgery," 6 and during the
postoperative phase of Moore's care." 7 The court then applied this
test for negligent informed consent to the other defendants" 8 and
concluded that since none of them were physicians, Moore had no
cause of action against them for breach of fiduciary duty." 9 The
majority stated that a patient would want to know of a physician's
economic interest,12 but its decision gives little guidance for the
trial court. Nowhere does the majority explain what are the elements
of this "new tort of nondisclosure of a research or economic
interest.'' The majority, however, did not rule out the possibility
"' Id. These were the elements of informed consent established under Cobbs
v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972).
"s

Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.

Id. Justice Panelli stated that there was written documentation indicating
that Golde had formed the intent to do research on the spleen before its removal.
Since Golde subsequently failed to disclose this to Moore, Golde violated his
fiduciary duty. Id.
"' Id. at 485. During this seven year period, Moore had repeatedly asked Golde
what was being done with all the fluid samples that were being taken from him.
Golde "expressly, affirmatively and impliedly represented... [to Moore] ... that
these withdrawals... were necessary and required for his health and well-being."
Id. Moore was not questioning the medical necessity to remove his spleen. He was
challenging the right of Golde to use the spleen for Golde's research without
obtaining Moore's specific consent to that use. Id. at 483-85. Further, the complaint
questioned whether Golde's repeated sampling of Moore's bodily fluids during
those seven years after surgery were truly required for Moore's health as Golde had
represented, or were for Golde's research purposes. Id. at 485-87.
11
This included defendants Quan, the Regents, Genetics Institute and Sandoz.
Id. at 486-87.
11Id. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 486-87; Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972)
(limiting application of medical malpractice law to medical professionals).
' ' Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
Michael Traynor, The Unjust Enrichment Claim in Moore v. Regents, 9
BIoTEcHNoLoGY L. REP. 240, 241 (1990). Michael Traynor is in private practice in
California, and was a co-author of the amicus curiae brief filed by the Industrial
Biotechnology Association (not to be mistaken for former California Supreme Court
Justice Roger Traynor). This decision leaves many issues unresolved, compared to
a personal injury action where there are principles guiding how damages can be
determined. Id. For example, the court provides no guidance for determining
damages that will be awarded if they are more than nominal damages. Another
issue left unresolved is the market value of the cells removed from the body, the
1
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of liability under a theory of secondary liability, such as respondeat
superior.'2
2. Majority Opinion: Conversion. - The majority opinion employed a
two-step analysis to hold that Moore had no cause of action for
conversion."' The key element to establish a claim for conversion
is that there must be interference with ownership or right to
possession."
The majority determined that Moore had no
property rights in his tissue, and therefore no cause of action under
current law."z The majority also refused to expand the current law
to include his claim. 26 Instead, the majority preferred not to
extend tort liability into a new area 27 and left such issues of public
policy to be resolved by the legislature."2
The majority opinion found that the common law tort of
conversion was applicable in a two-party situation, with a single
type of property damages resulting from that action, and the determination of those
damages. Id. Traynor proposes one possible solution based on equitable
apportionment, trying to strike a balance between the parties. Id. at 242-44.
However, giving Moore a percentage of the sales may in fact unjustly enrich him,
the same charge he made against the defendants. Id. at 243. See also Danforth, infra
note 178 and text accompanying notes 284-93.
1
,, Moore, 793 P.2d at 486. The issue of secondary liability of the Regents and
Quan may be determined by the trial court on remand. The majority affirmed this
part of the Court of Appeal's decision, enabling Moore to claim that Genetics
Institute and Sandoz are secondarily liable for Golde's torts. Id. at 487. Justice
Broussard, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, believed that the complaint
did state a cause of action against all of the defendants because of their
participation in the postoperative conduct. Id. at 499-500 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting). The majority suggests that Moore should not prevail under this
theory, however, since in a footnote this allegation was referred to as an "egregious
example of generic boilerplate" that had no support in the pleadings. Id. at 486-87,
486 n.12.
I

Id. at 497.

124Del

E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 824, 841 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981) (noting that if plaintiff never had title or possession of the property
claimed to be converted, there can be no cause of action for conversion).
125

Moore, 793 P.2d at 488.

'

Id. at 493-97.

' Id. at 493. This is opposite from the approach the California Supreme Court
has taken for nearly forty years, when it was noted for expanding tort liability.
For commentary on the changes in the court's tort philosophy, and how Moore
exemplifies the conservatism of the current court, see Blum, supra note 103.

" Moore, 793 P.2d at 496.
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plaintiff and a single defendant. 2 9 The majority opinion reasoned
that since cell lines and other biological products are freely
transferred among laboratories, liability in the Moore situation was
potentially applicable to an infinite number of unknown
defendants." ° Under such circumstances, the court would have to
extend the application of the law of conversion from its traditional

two-party context to a context with an infinite number of potential
defendants, and the court believed that this would be
impractical.'
The majority relied on three points in eliminating Moore's
cause of action for conversion.'32 The first point was the conclusion
that "[n]o court . . . has ever in a reported decision imposed
conversion liability for the use of human cells in medical
research."'"
Second, California Health and Safety Code statutes
regarding postoperative disposal of tissues"M were interpreted to
conclude that Moore did not expect to retain possession of his cells
after they were surgically removed." The majority concluded that
..Id. at 487.
1"0 Id. at 493-96. The majority noted that cell lines and other products are freely
exchanged among scientists. If the court were to grant a cause of action for
conversion, plaintiffs could conceivably assert their rights against each person who
obtained the cell line. The result could be that "[i]f the use of cells in research is
a conversion, then with every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a
litigation lottery." Id. at 495-96.
131 Id. at 487-88. The court noted that this is not the first time it has chosen not
to extend a doctrine of tort law for reasons of public policy. Id. at 488. The
majority also noted that there have been instances where they have extended tort
laws, but did not believe that public policy would allow an extension of the law
in this case. Id. at 488. Justice Mosk, in his dissenting opinion, reminded the
majority that the court has not let the fact that a case is of first impression to get
in its way of announcing new rules of tort law. Id. at 489 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
3

Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.

Id. at 487. One reason may be the field is new and the law is developing. Id.
at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "The issue is as new as its source-the recent explosive
growth in the commercialization of biotechnology." Id. The dissenting Justices
each note in separate opinions that on the other hand, no court has refused to
impose liability. See id. at 502 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 507
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
"4 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1990).
" The majority opinion here is directly the opposite of the court of appeal. See
1

supra text accompanying notes 79-89. Amicus Brief at 6-9, laid the framework for
the majority's conclusion. It argued that although California does define property
by statute, Moore's tissue did not fall into the definition of property. Id. it 7. Since
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these statutes limited a patient's interests in cells removed from his
or her body."
Last, since the cell line was patented by the
Regents, 13
the
cell
line
and its products simply cannot be Moore's
7
property.

The critical factor in the decision was that only property can
be converted." The majority opinion relied heavily on the OTA
Report 39 to conclude that the cells in the "Mo" cell line were not
Moore's property."4° Since the Health and Safety Code limits the
conditions for disposing of dead bodies and body parts, 41 its

practical effect restricts a patient's control over his or her own excised
cells." The majority opinion concluded that "[bly restricting how
excised cells may be used and requiring their eventual destruction,
the statute eliminates so many of the rights attached to property that
one simply cannot assume that what is left amounts to 'property' or
'ownership' for purposes of conversion law.""' The majority
concluded that with widespread distribution of samples, the potential
civil liability of many individuals in the industry would have a
Moore essentially abandoned his tissue after surgery, he surrendered any right to
its control or future disposition, as the tissue must be disposed of in accordance
with CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1990). Amicus Brief at 7-8.
The Amicus Curiae argued further that even if there was a property interest, no
conversion damages could be assessed since the diseased spleen had no market
value when it was removed. Id. at 8.
"'Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
IId. at 492-93. The majority stated that since the Regents owned the patent,
and the issuance of a patent is an authoritative determination of invention and
hence ownership, Moore could not own the cells or the cell line. Id.
'
'3

Id. at 490.
See OTA REPORT, supra note 5. See also opinion of Justice Mosk, infra text

accompanying notes 174-78, attacking the majority's use of this source.
majority relied heavily on the arguments in the Amicus Brief.

The

" Moore, 793 P.2d at 489-97.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1990) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable
anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains, or
infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be
disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method
determined by the state department to protect the public health and
safety.

141 CAL.

Id.(emphasis added).
4

Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92.

at 492. This concept was severely criticized by Justice Mosk in his
dissent. Id. at 508-510.
"Id.

516

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

chilling effect on research and development, such as restricting the
supply of raw materials.'"
The majority stated, however, that the patient's interest is
protected directly by the cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty.'" The case was remanded to the trial court to try the case
against Golde for breach of fiduciary duty and the lack of informed
consent.'" The trial court was also instructed to sustain all of the
defendants' demurrers to the cause of action for conversion 47 and
to hear and determine the remaining demurrers to Moore's
allegations.'"
3. Concurring Opinion. - The concurring opinion, written by Justice
Arabian, emphasized the moral issues underlying the case. 49 The
opinion's moral outrage" focused on the concept that Moore was
asking for approval to sell his own body for profit.'' The
concurring opinion commented that "[Moore] entreats us to regard
the human vessel - the single most venerated and protected subject
in any civilized society - as equal with the basest commercial
commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the
profane."'52 Justice Arabian noted the conflicting interests involved:
moral, philosophical and religious views, the economics of granting
property rights, competitive bidding for body parts, and the potential
exposure of researchers to unlimited tort liability."
Since the
'"Id. at 493-97. The court stated that conversion is a strict liability tort in
California, and would invite individuals who obtained cell samples to enter "a
ticket in a litigation lottery" with every sample they obtained. Id. at 495-96. See also
Amicus Brief at 14-19 (arguing that even bona fide transferrees would become
liable should a cause of action for conversion be granted). This would add
significant costs to administration of a research program, and possibly cause many
hospitals to withdraw from participation in research using excised tissue. Id. at 17-

18.
SId. at 494.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 497. The trial court was ordered to sustain the demurrers
of Sandoz and Genetics Institute for these two causes of action. Id.
147Id.

IId. See supra note 10 for these additional causes of action.
'9

Moore, 793 P.2d at 497-98 (Arabian, J., concurring).

"5Justice Arabian noted that while he shared the outrage of dissenting Justice
Mosk, he could not agree with the remainder of Justice Mosk's opinion. Id. at 497.
' Id. at 497-98.
152 id. at 497.
"3 Id. at 498.
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plaintiff was not left without a remedy,"s' and the decision
involved the resolution of numerous conflicting policy interests, the
concurring opinion agreed that the court should not recognize
property rights in the tissue.'4. The Concurringand Dissenting Opinion. - The partial concurrence
and dissent by Justice Broussard noted the unique setting of this case
and the interest it has generated in the scientific and medical
communities." The usual situation is that tissue is removed with
the informed consent of the patient for use in scientific purposes and
that the value of the excised tissue is often determined years
later.1 7 He contrasts this to Moore's situation, where there were
allegations that the physician recognized the value of the organ prior
to its removal and failed to disclose this information to the
patient. 8
(a) Breach offiduciary duty. - Justice Broussard concurred with
the majority opinion in granting a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty by defendant Golde 59 He believed, however, that
the pleadings were sufficient to suggest that the other defendants
may have been in complicity with Golde during the postoperative
years that Golde was following Moore and simultaneously
developing, patenting, and licensing the cell line."
Thus,
discovery would be necessary to determine the degree of complicity
of Genetics Institute and Sandoz by withholding disclosure to Moore.
According to Justice Broussard, the pleading stage was too premature
154

Plaintiff did retain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 479.

Id. Justice Arabian also stated that this was within the scope of the
legislature, not the court. Id. Both the majority and Justice Arabian stressed that
the decision did not leave Moore without a remedy. However, in his concurring
and dissenting opinion, Justice Broussard raised the following hypothetical
situation. What would the court do when faced with a "typical case" involving a
patient who did give informed consent, only later to find out that the material had
an unanticipated value? Under the majority's view, this patient would be
remediless; he would not have a cause of action for conversion, and also no cause
of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 500-01 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
'i'

Id. at 498.

157

Id. at 499. See also Amicus Brief at 16-18.

'5s

Moore, 793 P.2d at 499 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).

159Id.

"o Id. at 499-500. Golde first discussed the possibility of patenting with the
Regents in 1979.
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to dismiss
any defendant from liability for breach of fiduciary
161
duty.

(b) Conversion. - The partial concurring and dissenting
opinion argued that the complaint stated a cause of action for
conversion and that there was no necessity to look beyond the
common law tort of conversion. 62 Again, the first question was
whether there is a property right to tissue."6 Justice Broussard
161Id. at

500 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). The Justices disagreed

whether breach of fiduciary duty is a satisfactory remedy. Justice Mosk attacked
this "paper tiger" theory of recovery as one that would create too many obstacles
for a plaintiff to overcome. He argued that even if a remedy were available to the
plaintiff, it would, in effect, be no remedy. Id. at 520 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Broussard argued that punitive as well as compensatory damages could be
available to a plaintiff, even if the majority has not spelled out the types of
damages a plaintiff could recover. Id. at 500 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting). He argued that a plaintiff would only have to show that the
physician's wrongful failure to disclose information was the proximate cause of
"some type of compensable damage." Id. at 500.
162Id. at 500.
16
Id. at 501. The opinion raised the hypothetical situation of another medical
school or drug company taking and using for their own benefit the cell line that
Golde had developed. Golde would then have a cause of action in conversion
against that other school or company. Justice Broussard claimed that this situation
would bring the majority of the court into agreement with his position. Id. This
"hypothetical" situation was not actually hypothetical at all. Another cell line that
Golde developed in the 1970s is also a potent producer of interferon. Genentech
Scrambles Gene Fragments to Clone Novel Potent Hybrid Interferon, BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWSWATCH, Jan. 18, 1982, at 2. This cell line, designated KG-1, was originally
derived from bone marrow cells of a patient who died of leukemia in 1977. The
cell line became the subject of a suit between Golde and Hoffman-LaRoche Inc.
(Roche) over property rights to the cell line. Golde sent a sample of KG-1 cells to
an investigator at Roche. Later, Roche scientists sent modified KG-1 cells to
investigators at Genentech Corporation, who were collaborating with Roche in
studies involving interferon. Golde's suit alleged that Roche had converted the cell
line, as well as misappropriated trade secrets. Roche Charges Slander in Amended
Complaint Against UCLA Researcher, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, May 18, 1981, at
1. The suit was later settled for an undisclosed sum to be paid to the Regents of
the University. Roche Gives University of California 'Substantial Sum' in Law Suit
Settlement BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Jan. 17, 1983, at 4. The settlement
established that Golde had property rights to the cell line, and that universities can
give their property to other parties without surrendering their rights. The suit was
settled under a protective order. There was no claim by the estate of the patient
from whose cells the KG-1 line was derived concerning rights to the cell line. Id.
Thus, it is ironic that Golde was sued for conversion. However, the Moore case can
be distinguished from the dispute between Golde and Roche and Genentech. The
latter involved the value of the cell line as property, while Moore is concerned with
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viewed the issue as whether a patient has a right to determine,
before the body part is removed, the use of that body part after
removal," and criticized the majority for not being able to support
its denial of property rights to Moore with either case law or
statutes. 16s He interpreted California's version of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act to infer that a person has a right to control what
is done to his or her body parts.'" According to Justice Broussard,
when the U.A.G.A. is interpreted together with California common
law, it satisfies
the elements needed to state a cause of action for
67
conversion.

1

(c) Policy issues. - Justice Broussard pointed out a significant
policy issue that was seemingly ignored by the majority, whether the
patient should be able to obtain any economic value from the
subsequent use of his or her tissue." He intimates that legislative
action may be needed to establish a repository for body parts, similar
to what is done for organs used in transplantation; 69 however,
there does not appear to be any proscription against the sale of body
whether the individual whose tissues were used in developing the cell line has
rights in those tissues after they are removed from his/her body.
'" Moore, 793 P.2d at 501 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
165 Id.
166Id. at 501. California codified the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7156 (West Supp. 1990). Sections 7150.1, 7150.5
and 7153, when read together, suggest that an individual has a right to control the
disposition of his/her body parts. Section 7150.1(a) states that an "Anatomical giff
means a donation of all or part of a human body ... to take effect after death."
Section 7150.5 describes procedures for an individual to make an anatomical gft;
§ 7150.5(f) prescribes procedures for amending, or even revoking that gift. Section
7153 describes those organizations who can receive organs and also allows the
donor to select the receiver of the donation. Using these provisions, Justice
Broussard concluded that the plaintiff could have a property right and right to
control the disposition of his body tissue. Moore, 793 P.2d at 505.
167 Moore, 793 P.2d at 505 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
168 Id.
1" Id. at 506 n.5. See National Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-275
(Supp. 1990) [hereinafter N.O.T.A.]. This legislation establishes a national organ
procurement and transplantation network. Id. The legislative history of the
N.O.T.A. indicates that its purposes were to improve procedures leading to organ
procurement and successful transplantation, and to prevent the sale of kidneys and
various organs for profit. See S. REP. No. 98-383, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3975, 3978. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7154.5 (West Supp. 1990) similarly provides that hospitals shall
coordinate with each other for procurement and use of body parts.
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parts for purposes other than transplantation or donation.17 In this
way, the majority's decision does not really benefit Moore. It does
give him a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, but ignores
the issue of the patient's right to make autonomous medical
decisions.
If the policy concern of the court is to prevent anyone from
receiving a windfall from sale of body parts, the decision fails."7 '
Moore does not receive a property right to his tissues, nor does the
decision "elevat[e] these biological materials above the marketplace
....

",''

The decision merely prevents the plaintiff from obtaining

any recovery of the value of his tissue, but allows the defendants
"who allegedly obtained the cells from plaintiff by improper means,
to retain and exploit the full economic value of their ill-gotten gains
free of their ordinary common law liability for conversion."" 3
5. Dissenting Opinion. - Justice Mosk agreed only with that portion
of the opinion that held a physician must disclose any economic or
research interests held in the patient's tissues and that nondisclosure
would give rise to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. 74
170 Moore, 793 P.2d at 506 and n.5 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155(a) (West Supp. 1990) prohibits the purchase

or sale of a body part, after the death of the donor, for use in transplantation,
therapy or reconditioning. It is silent on the use of organs or tissues in research or
commercial product development. This section of the California Code is patterned
after U.A.G.A. § 10. The comment to that section states that it is not intended to
cover the sale of organs by living donors, if the removal of the organs is to occur
during that person's lifetime. UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT, 8A U.L.A., at 25 (West
Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). The Moore opinion made no reference to the federal
U.A.G.A. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 479-523.
'" Id. at 505 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
'7 Id. at 506.
173id.

"7'Id. at 519 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk strongly disagreed with the
remainder of the majority opinion. Among his arguments were that the majority
failed to allow a cause of action to a well-pleaded complaint for conversion, and
the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty may only be an illusory remedy.
See infra text accompanying notes 176-92 for further discussion of Justice Mosk's
view of the limited applications of this part of the Court's holding. Although the
United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari,Justice Mosk's opinion will be
discussed here because it may be persuasive if similar suits are filed in other
jurisdictions. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). John
Moore's attorney stated earlier that if certiorariis denied, he anticipates seeking the
formation of a constructive trust to force the defendants to disgorge their profits.
See Research-ProfitsSuit, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1990, at 22.
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The dissent argued that the complaint stated a cause of action for
conversion and agreed with the opinion of the court of appeals.17
(a) Amateur biology lecture. - The dissent sharply attacked the
17 stating that the majority
majority's "amateur biology lecture,""
improperly used certain sources as the basis of its opinion."r The
dissent further questioned whether the majority's explanation was
correct or if it omitted information that would support a contrary
position, since there had been no fact-finding."
(b) Remaining issues: necessity to make new laws. - The dissent
reminded the majority that the court has yet to allow a case of first
impression to deter it from making new law.'" It cited Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories,8° a case similar to Moore that involved
"'advances in science and technology' that could not have been
foreseen when ... the law of conversion - was formulated." 8 ' The

dissent's point was that the court in Sindell had created a remedy,
and that it should not hesitate from doing so solely because no other
"Th
Moore, 793 P.2d at 523 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
176

Id. at 521.

-

'" Id. at 521-22. The dissent reiterated that there has still been no finding of
fact, and the record before the court consisted of pleadings. No evidence was
taken, nor was there any testimony from expert witnesses to clarify the technical
aspects of molecular biology that were in the pleadings. Id. Since the majority
relied on material that was not in the record, with no advice from experts, the
dissent questioned whether. they could truly understand the nuances of the
molecular biology they were using to establish their opinion. Id.
" Id. In effect,. Justice Mosk's argument raises the issue of whether the
majority, sub silentio, has taken judicial notice of the molecular biology and
biotechnology principles involved in the case. See id. at 521-23. The majority
ignores certain points in order to reach its conclusions of law. In contrast, the law
review article cited by the dissent to support his position was not cited by the
majority at all. See Mary Taylor Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's

Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POLICY REv. 179 (1989).
'" Moore, 793 P.2d at 507-08 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The majority noted that this
was a case of first impression, and was hesitant to expand the law of conversion.
See majority opinion, supra text accompanying notes 123-48.
" Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1981) (Mosk opinion creating "market share" theory of liability for drug
manufacturers when a person suffered a drug-related injury, but could not identify
the manufacturer of the particular drug that caused her injury).
1' Moore, 793 P.2d at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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court or legislature has acted on the issues. 2
(c) Statutory basis of majority decision. - The majority holding
that Moore had no property rights in excised tissue was based on a
statute that regulates the disposal of human remains."s
The
majority concluded that the statutory controls placed on the disposal
of dead bodies and human body parts reduced property rights to a
point that Moore had no property right to his tissue.14 The statute
specifically refers to scientific use of the body part."s The dissent
argued that one's connotation of "science" is research that is done for
the purpose of furthering scientific or medical knowledge; it is
research that is done not for profit."M "[I]t is between a truly
scientific use and the blatant commercial exploitation of Moore's tissue
that the present complaint alleges."'1 7 The commercial use of
discarded body tissue would not be an acceptable use of the material
according to the statute."s Thus, Section 7054.4 of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act," 9 relied on by the majority, would not be
applicable. The defendants argued that their rights to the cell line is
not barred by this statute. 190 Such a result is the irony noted by the
appellate court: the defendants can own Moore's cells, but Moore
cannot.'9 ' The dissent also emphasized that the majority was
unable to cite any case to support its bare conclusion that Moore had
18Id. at 487-98 (majority opinion). See also Blum, supra note 103, at 50-52
(noting that Justice Mosk, along with Justice Broussard, was on the California

Supreme Court during its activist years).
" CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1990). The majority and
the dissent differed on the interpretation of this statute, with the majority arguing
there was no property right. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-98 (majority opinion). The
dissent followed the majority opinion of the appellate division, and argued that the
statute granted Moore a property right to his tissue. Id. at 508-12 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
1" See supra text accompanying notes 106-48, relating to the majority opinion
and the basis for it. The dissent pointed out that based on the majority's
interpretation, it would be unclear as to who would have rights to use human
tissue. Moore, 793 P.2d at 508-510, 508 n.5 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
15 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155(a) (West Supp. 1990).
16 Moore, 793 P.2d at 508-09 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
18 Id. at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

Id. at 508.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT,8A U.L.A. 2 (1990).
19Moore, 793 P.2d at 510. See also Amicus Brief at 7-9.
1 Moore, 793 P.2d at 510 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
'

19
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no property right. 192
(d) Conversion. - The dissent argued that Moore's claim fit
within the current scope of the law of conversion, asserting that
contrary to the majority opinion there was no need to extend the
scope of the law."9 The dissent described the general trend in
science toward secrecy, " and questioned the "innocence" of the
individuals the majority is seeking to protect by denying a cause of
action for conversion.195 The dissent argued that these individuals
could easily protect themselves from liability by thorough record
keeping and enclosing a copy of1 the documentation when sending a
sample to another investigator. '
The dissent noted the potential profitability of the industry;
it can be anywhere from $15-300 billion, with most of the profit split
between universities and the biotechnology companies."9 He noted
the Regents' and Golde's economic gain from patenting the "Mo" cell
line." ' Of the three components of the biotechnology industry, the
third and critical component of the industry is the patient who is the
'" Id. In essence, this case turned on statutory interpretation, the majority
inferring no property rights and the dissent inferring that the plaintiff had a right
to his tissues. The critical factor for both sides was public policy, the majority
taking a pragmatic view in light of California's economic interests, the dissent
focusing more on the human aspects of policy. See Annas, Selling Cells, supra note
105, at 36-39. See also George Annas, Blinded by Science, 9 BIOTECHNOLOCY L. REP.
245 (1990) [hereinafter Annas, Blinded].
'9' Moore, 793 P.2d at 510 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 513-16 (citing John Howard, Biotechnology, Patients' Rights, and the
Moore Case, 44 FOOD, DRUG, & COSMETICS L.J. 331 (1989) (court of appeal's decision
also commented on the increased frequency of biotechnology patents, and the
consequent increase in secrecy in the field)). Regarding this trend, see also Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
modified, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991); see also OTA
REPORT, supra note 5, at 7 and text accompanying notes 42-45 (describing the
increased incidence of patenting in the biological and medical sciences).
" Moore, 793 P.2d at 513-16 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The dissent noted statements
by the Regents indicating that distribution of the "Mo" cell line was restricted. Id.
at 513. This contrasts with statements in the majority opinion that samples are
freely exchanged among scientists. Id. at 493-96 (majority opinion). The majority
could be said to be protecting the innocent bona fide transferrees who received cell
lines without knowing their entire history. See Amicus Brief at 14-16.
'
Moore, 793 P.2d at 513 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
I9 at 516.
Id.
1IId.
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source of many of the raw materials.'" Since the industry is thus
dependent upon patients for sources, reasons of both morality and
fairness suggest that a patient should share in the proceeds,
especially if science has become science for profit.Yo The dissent
argued that Moore should be allowed to maintain an action for
conversion based upon reasons of morality and fairness.'
According to the dissent, since a property right to tissue
could be inferred from existing statutes, there would be no need to
expand the current law of conversion.'
The dissent interpreted
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,' which prohibits the sale of
organs that are used for transplantation or therapy after the death of
the donor, to infer a property right to one's tissue" 4 The statute
expressly proscribes the sales of organs for purposes of
transplantation or therapy after the death of the donor, but is silent
on sales for other purposes.' The dissent argues that since there
is a legitimate market for body parts such as blood and blood
products,' there can be an implied property right to tissue and
other body parts.' Therefore, Moore should be able to maintain
a cause of action for conversion without legislative intervention. W
(e) The majority's illusory cause of action. - The dissent
concluded that the remedy the majority granted Moore under breach
of fiduciary duty was "largely illusory"' since it would only apply
to physicians, and would bar a plaintiff from recovering from other
defendants who were not physicians.210 Justice Mosk concluded
9
2'

Id. at 516-17.
Id at 516.

2 Id.

Id.

2W2

U.A.G.A., 8A U.L.A., at 25.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 516-17 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
sId. See also U.A.G.A., 8A U.L.A., at 25.
Blood and blood products are sold for profit, but under California case law,
a legal fiction has been created to characterize the sale of blood and blood products
as services, to avoid the implied warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Moore, 793 P.2d at 518 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1606 (West 1990) (explicitly stating that transfers of blood and blood
products are to be construed as services).
' Moore, 793 P.2d at 518 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2W Id.
'N Id. at 519.
210

Id. at 521.
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that the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was inadequate
because in all likelihood the plaintiff would not be able to prevail,
the patient's rights would not be protected, and the real exploiters
would escape liability."'
IV. THE RESPONSE To MOORE

The scientific community responded swiftly to the Moore
decision."
Within weeks, commentaries appeared in the major
publications reporting the outcome and its possible effects on the
industry.
Thus, the California Supreme Court decision has been
seen as a "muted victory" by the industry, 4 or as a "[clollective
sigh of relief."21 The Association of Biotechnology Companies 6
stated that numerous lawsuits would probably ensue if the court had
ruled that Moore had a cause of action for conversion.2"7 In
contrast, Weber21 viewed the decision as "[a] stay, rather than a
victory." '19 The thrust of Weber's argument was that the California
Supreme Court is now a conservative court that simply refused to
deal with the real issues.22
Nevertheless, these commentaries all emphasize that the issue
of informed consent for research use and commercialization is still
undecided, and that regardless of outcome, the ultimate resolution
211Id.
2

See Barinaga, supra note 16, at 239; Leigh Dayton, Patient Denied Rights to

Own Tissue, NEW SCIENTIST, July 21, 1990, at 17; Gerry L. Elman, Physician's Self-

disclosure Emerges as a Key Issue from the Moore Case, GENETIC

ENGINEERING NEWS,

Sept. 1990, at 3; Therapeutics Under Review, Moore Rebufted; No PropertyRight to Body
Tissue, 8 BIOTECHNOLOGY 697 (1990); Robin Eisner, Tissues Not For Sale, 346 NATURE
208 (1990).
13 See supra note 212.
24 Barinaga, supra note 16, at 239.
21 Dayton, supranote 212, at 17 (quoting Arthur Caplan, Director of Biomedical
Ethics, University of Minnesota).
26 An industry organization based in Washington, D.C.
217 Dayton, supra note 212, at 17.
21 Kenneth A. Weber is a patent attorney practicing in San Francisco who
prosecuted one of defendant Golde's patents.
219 Kenneth A. Weber, A Stay, Rather Than A Victory For Biotechnology, 9
BIOTECHNOLocY L. REP. 267 (1990).
IId. at 268-70.
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of this case will affect biomedical research."' For example,
research and hospital personnel will have to seek informed consent
using procedures more detailed than they currently employ.'
While there have been several symposia dealing with the
legal issues raised by advances in areas such as genetics, molecular
biology, and in vitro fertilization,' one dealt with the commercial
Id. The publisher of GENETIC

posed a four question
survey to the research community. Mary Ann Liebert, From the Publisher...,
GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 1990, at 4. The questions were as follows:
1. Do you think that any individual is entitled to a royalty or fee
for the development of any product derived from the unique
material from his body cells of tissues?...
2. Should scientists/physicians be required to ask for a release
from a patient whose tissues or cells may be used for the
ENGINEERING NEws

development of a commercial product? ...

3. Would the requirement of such a disclosure impede the
progress of scientific research? ...

4. Would the requirement of such a disclosure impede the
progress of product development?
Thomas H. Murray Ph.D., Moore v. UC Regents - GEN Readers Say Doctors Must
Obtain PatientReleases, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Feb. 1991, at 4. Approximately
760 responses were received from among a readership of over 24,000. The group
was evenly split concerning whether a patient is entitled to a royalty. However,
78% favored the use of a consent form, and between 62-68% felt that such
disclosure would not impede the progress or product development or scientific
research. Id. Thomas Murray is a biomedical ethicist from Case-Western Reserve
University School of Medicine who analyzed the data. Id. at 30. He noted that the
respondents' comments dealt with two main issues: whether Moore, or other
sources in general, should be compensated, and how will this affect the sourcedonor relationship. Id. at 4. Murray considers that Moore made a gift of his
spleen, and a recipient of that gift does not have an absolute right, but rather a
moral obligation to use it in keeping with the donor's intentions. Id. at 30.
.m.
See generallyFAY A. RoZOVSKY, CONSENT To TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
(2d ed. 1990).
' See Brett Lockwood, Bibliography: Genetics and the Law, 39 EMORY L.J. 875
(1990). Lockwood has compiled a comprehensive bibliography of law review and
scientific articles in approximately thirty areas of law and science. This includes
topics such as DNA fingerprinting, ethical concerns of science and medicine, gene
therapy, in vitro fertilization, patents and proprietary rights, reproductive
technology and tort liability. See also AUBREY MILUNSKY & GEORGE J. ANNAS,
GENETICS AND THE LAW III (1984), regarding proceedings of the third symposium
to address current issues in law involving biotechnology, genetics and medicine.
The symposium was entitled Biotechnology: Boom or Bane? and it was sponsored by
the Boston University Schools of Medicine, Law and Public Health, and the
American Society for Law and Medicine.
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use of tissues.'
The consensus of the participants -was that
researchers who intend to use patient materials for potential
commercial use should obtain, in advance, informed consent for that
specific use.'
For example, one investigator from the University
of California described an incident that lead him to Urge other
researchers to spell out, in advance, what the ownership and
commercial consequences of the research might be.' 6 The dispute
that arose was similar to Moore in that the tissue donor's family
claimed ownership of the genes that were being propagated in the
new cell line. 7 However, the case was distinguished from Moore
because the family'm had claimed inventorship for "[having] the
idea in the first place." 9 Ultimately, Royston concluded, using the
advantage of hindsight, that new laws are necessary to delineate
what patient's rights, if any, there should be in commercial products
that may be derived from tissue.'
He also stressed that any
ownership and commercial consequences of the research studies
' See Ivor Royston, Cell Lines From Human Patients:Who Owns Them? A Case
Report, 33 CLINICAL RESEARCH 442 (1985). The symposium on The Legal, Ethical and
Economic Impact of Patient Materials Used for Product Development in the Biomedical
Industry was an attempt by the medical community to address issues underlying
the Moore case. It was sponsored by the American Federation for Clinical Research.
s See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
' See Royston, supra note 224.
Royston was a cancer researcher at the
University of California, San Diego School of Medicine.
Id. at 443. Royston's laboratory developed a cell line that produced a
monoclonal antibody to a cancerous tumor that affected a family member of a
student. Royston was unaware that the student's (Hagiwara's) father was head of
a medical institute in Japan (The Hagiwara Institute of Health) when the student
suggested this project to him. This monoclonal antibody was a potential
therapeutic agent for this specific cancer. A dispute ensued when the student
wanted to take the cell line back to Japan for commercialization, while the
University sought to patent the cell line. The suit was settled, giving the Hagiwara
Institute an exclusive license to the cell line in Japan and Asia, in exchange for
paying royalties on commercial sales to the University. Id.
' Hagiwara was the student who proposed the project and from whose mother
the cancerous cells used to develop the monoclonal antibody were obtained. Id. at
442.
m Id. In contrast, Moore was not claiming inventorship, but merely a share of
the profits resulting from the commercialization of his tissues, arguing that on a
"but for" basis, there would not have been any "Mo cell line" to begin with. Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 511 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
230 Royston, supra note 224, at 443.
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should be spelled out in advance of future research. 3'
By contrast, the counsel for the University of California
concluded that a physician/scientist has no duty to inform a patient
of the physician's interest in research. 32 There are four methods
to obtain lawfully human tissue for research uses.'3 Two methods
involve obtaining samples from living ,patients and impact the
scientist/human subject relationship where the patient consents to
removal for research purposes, and the physician/patient
relationship, where consent is obtained for medical reasons.' The
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and statutes addressing dead bodies
are the other avenues that allow access to tissue from dead
sources.'3
Although he touched briefly on the fiduciary duty
between the physician and patient, Wagner concluded that advising
patients of any research interests is really not necessary.'
There
is an independent duty of care within the physician/patient
relationship and an independent duty to the physician's research; but
Wagner believed that as long as the physicians and scientists can
separate their patient responsibilities from their research activities, it
would be unnecessary for them to be merged by the law. 37
The fiduciary relationship between the physician and patient
that Wagner glossed over, however, formed the basis for the majority
231

Id.

2 Allen B. Wagner, The Legal Impact of Patient Materials Used for Product
Development in the Biomedical Industry, 33 CLINICAL RESEARCH 444, 446 (1985).
2 Id. at 446.
2M Id.
Z Id.
2 Id.
[There appears to be no requirement to introduce the subject of
independent research into the physician/patient relationship ....
That's not to say,
you could not put it in there. Some suggest there is no harm in discussing it. But,
what it may do to the physician/patient relationship to introduce independent
research is a question you'll have to resolve." Id.
IId. at 446. However, Moore illustrates the need to do just this. Either keep
them separate, which for many researchers may be difficult, or get better consent
when obtaining the tissues. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793
P.2d 479, 479-523 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). See also Are
Scientific Misconduct and Conflicts of InterestHazardous to our Health? HOUSE COMM.
ON GOV'T OPERATIONS REP., H.R. REP. No. 101-688, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
(dealing with questions of conflicts of interest where researchers own biotechnology
companies whose products they may be testing, and other types -of misconduct
such as falsifying data).
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opinion in Moore.' Although Wagner stated that this would be
proper provided that there are no additional risks to the patient, he
felt the outcome should be left to the medical community to resolve
by itself.2 3 9

The researchers had mixed views on allowing patients

ownership rights, in contrast to the ethicists, who were generally
concerned with protecting patients' rights. Caplan,2' for example,
focused on the physician-patient fiduciary relationship and its
relationship to issues involving the procurement of organs for
transplantation, and. uses of tissue for research and
commercialization.2 l
Caplan stressed the danger that
commercializing physicians' research would result in undermining
the trust of patients by encouraging patients to suspect that they are
being put at risk, not for their medical well-being, but rather to
further the physician's own for-profit motives.2' He concluded
that the intent of the physician is critical and should be disclosed to
the patient.2' In other words, it is one thing to discover after the
fact that a product can be developed from a bodily fluid, but
deliberately collecting bodily fluids hoping they will be valuable
presents a different ethical matter.2'

z Wagner, supra note 232, at 447. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 480-81.
n9 Wagner, supra note 232, at 447. His conclusion can be summarized as
follows: while there might be no harm to discussing this information with a patient,

if there was no legal duty to do so, why bother?
240 Arthur L. Caplan was a biomedical ethicist from the Hastings Center, a nonprofit organization concerned with legal issues that involve science, medicine and
the public interest.
241Arthur L. Caplan, Blood, Sweat, Tears, and Profits: The Ethics of the Sale and

Use of Patient Derived Materials in Biomedicine, 33 CLINICAL RESEARCH 448 (1985).
2
' Id. at 450. These were some of the concerns described in the California Code
as the basis for enacting the statutes dealing with informed consent for human
experimentation. CAL. HEALTH & SAFY CODE § 24171 (West 1984).
243 Id. at 451.
244Id. Contra Leon E. Rosenberg, Using PatientMaterialsfor Product Development:
A Dean's Perspective,33 CLINICAL RESEARCH at 453 (1985) (human experimentation
protocols should expressly state that subjects would not share in any gains from
the investigation). Compare Rosenberg's opinion with Murray, supra note 221. This
debate about disclosure appears moot in light of Moore. The medical and legal
communities should now focus on defining what is proper disclosure and what is
informed consent. While the majority opinion granted Moore a cause of action in
these areas, its decision provided little guidance for the trial court on remand. See
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
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V. OPINIONS FROM OTHER COMMENTATORS

The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, as well as
the academic, industrial and medical research communities, have a
strong interest in the eventual outcome of the Moore case.' 5 This
suit has been in progress for nearly eight years, tried solely on the
pleadings and was remanded to the trial court, but with no findings
of fact.2' While industry responded favorably to Moore,"7 legal
commentators have not been so kind, viewing it as a nondecision.20
Professor Robert Bohrel " 9 has stated quite bluntly that
"[tihe court blundered"' for failing to provide Moore with any
remedy in its attempt to protect the industry. 1 He asserts that the
court should have been concerned with providing a remedy,
although perhaps limiting the damages available, instead of denying
Moore a cause of action for conversion. 2 He emphasizes the
argument made by Justice Broussard that Moore did retain dominion
and control of his cells up to the time of conversion which was when
they were removed surgically,' but that the majority simply chose
e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 61-63.
793 P.2d at 497.
24 See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
24 See Symposium on Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 9
245 See,

246Moore,

BIoTEcHNoLoGY L. REP. 239 (1990) [hereinafter Symposium] (series of commentaries
by different authors, written independently of each other). One commentator, Gary
L. Shaffer, wrote about various current issues in patent law. Regarding the
unconsented marketing of patient's tissues, Shaffer noted the scarcity of plaintiffs
"when there are no deep pockets." He suggested that arguments will be made in
the future that the presence of a profitable product will indicate that something of
value was taken from the patient. However, at the time when his spleen was
removed, Moore had no idea as to its value. Shaffer also argued that any value the
spleen had came from the researcher's (Golde's) efforts. Further, Shaffer states that
most jurists are ignorant of science, and doubts whether any court, even with the
aid of amicus briefs, can competently consider cases such as Moore. Gary L.
Shaffer, Moore Defines the Issues But Only Legislation Will Settle the Controversy, in
Symposium, supra, at 261.
249 Robert A. Bohrer is a professor of law at California Western School of Law
in San Diego.
' Robert A. Bohrer, Old Blood in New Bottles, 9 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 251, 252

(1990).
251Id.

2'2Id. at 252-53.

Id. at 254-55.
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to ignore this.'
Perhaps the court was simply blinded by
science,'
and chose to defer to the biotechnology industry's
interests.'
In George Annas' view, Moore should have gotten
some value for his cells. 7 Thus, the court did not resolve the
question of what value, if any, should be given to diseased tissue.
To Moore, his spleen was diseased tissue that needed to be removed
in order to save his life. The Amicus Curiae argued that value was
imparted to it through the actions of Golde and his coworkers.'
In light of its history of being at the forefront of tort law, the
court's position is extremely weak .' The majority based its
holding of the breach of fiduciary duty on the doctrine of negligent
informed consent.'
But the limits of the court's holding are
unknown. The court intimated that the holding would probably be
applicable to competent persons able to consent."6 The court did
not address issues of whether a surrogate should make decisions for
incompetent patients or patients who refuse to consent.262
Although the case was remanded for trial on the issue of breach of
fiduciary duty, the court did not address what sort of mechanisms
should be instituted to protect a patient from undue influence or
coercion by a physician who is seeking commercially viable
materials.'
The court also did not address the scope of disclosure
that the requesting physician should make, such as what share of the
profits the physician may receive upon commercialization or what
2M

Id.
Annas, Blinded, supra note 192, at 245.

See generallyMoore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479,479-97
(Cal. 1990) (court appeared to be persuaded by the Amicus Brief of the Industrial
Biotechnology Association, and took an economic way out), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.

1388 (1991).
' Annas, Blinded, supra note 192, at 248 (suggesting that even those from the
"law and economics" school would have given Moore some value, merely as a cost
of doing business).
Amicus Brief at 5, 6, 10-14.
See Blum, supra note 103.
20 See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972).
"' See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479,483 (Cal. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
See ROZOVSKY, supra note 222, at 634 (§9.5.2).
Id. The majority may have believed that the provisions of the California
Code dealing with human experimentation would be sufficient. See CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 24170-24179.5 (West Supp. 1990)
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the physician's current economic interests in the research are.2 "
Moreover, it is likely that these issues will arise in the future in
either the same or different contexts.m
Moore has been discussed in many reviews published prior
to the California Supreme Court decision,' " and several authors
have proposed rules regarding property rights or informed consent
either based on the appellate opinion, or in anticipation of the
California Supreme Court opinion.26 7 The appellate decision and
See ROZOVSKY, supra note 222.

The Sixth Circuit held that a widow has a possessory right inher deceased
husband's body, and that the removal of decedent's corneas could not be performed
without due process. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991)
(coroner failed to follow consent procedures for enucleation of corneas prescribed
by Ohio's Uniform Anatomical Gift Act). The court noted that recent advancements
in medicine and biotechnology have stressed the importance of establishing rights
in a dead body, and was relieved by not having to determine whether the widow
had a property interest in the body. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481.
See Wells, supra note 58, at 379; Danforth, supra note 178, at 198-200.
27 See Dillon, Note, supra note 31, at 630. He concluded that public policy
should be the overriding factor in denying a property right to individuals who
serve as sources for products that are developed from their tissues. Id. Dillon also
highlighted the potential abuses that could result from granting property rights to
tissue. Id. at 637-38. See also Wells, supra note 58, at 379-80 (arguing that the
definitions of informed consent should be more explicit, and that governmentfunded research laboratories receive the financial gains from products that are
patented). But see Danforth, supra note 178, at 192-94 (arguing that the propertybased right over one's name or likeness extends to the human body). Moore made
a property argument based on cases holding there is a proprietary interest in one's
likeness. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479,490. (Cal. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). The California Supreme Court distinguished
these wrongful-publicity cases and denied Moore property rights for the purposes
of conversion. Id. (stating that neither case cited based its holding expressly on
property law) (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323) (1979) and
Motschenbacker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)). See
Roy Hardiman, Note, Towards The Right of Commerciality: Recognizing PropertyRights
in The Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1986) (arguing that
there should be limited property rights to avoid the pitfalls of absolute ownership,
yet to recognize that each person has a right to the commercial potential of their
body). See also Aaron Chess Lichtman, Note, Commercial Exploitation of DNA and
the Tort of Conversion: A Physician May Not Destroy a Patient'sInterest in Her Body
Matter, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 207 (1986) (arguing that a person's body is tangible
personal property and that a physician's use of tissue is inconsistent with the
person's property interests). The author infers that the "bloodshield" statutes
"provide affirmative evidence that body-matter is property." Id. at 547. The
statutes that provide that transfer of blood products and transfusions are services,
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the supreme court majority opinion emphasized that the legislature
should resolve the underlying problems highlighted by the case.'
One author has suggested legislation to provide a patient
with fully informed consent' using principles derived from the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act7 and the National Organ Transplant
Act.' This proposal would prohibit the sale or purchase of body
parts that would be developed into a commercial product through
not sales, are "bloodshield" statutes. Id. at 543-46. But see Nancy E. Field, Note,
Evolving Conceptualizationsof Property: A Proposal to De-Commercialize the Value of
Fetal Tissue, 99 YALE L. J. 169 (1989). Tissue from fetuses has unique properties for
biomedical research. Field argues that granting a property interest in fetal tissue
would be against public policy. Citing a report from the American Association of
Medical Colleges, she concluded there would be a great likelihood that individuals
would conceive, and later intentionally abort the fetuses in order to sell the fetal
organs for transplantation, or to commercialize a product that may be developed
in order to treat an ailing family member. Id. at 175-76, 183. For example, in
California, the bone marrow of a 14 month old girl was successfully transplanted
into her 19 year old sister, who was suffering from leukemia. The children's
parents admitted conceiving the baby in order to save their elder daughter's life.
Gina Kolata, More Babies Being Born To Be Donorsof Tissue, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,1991,
at Al.
These commentaries illustrate the complexity of whether the body should
be considered as property, and, if it is considered property, what should the limits
be. For example, if the body and its organs are property then the woman could do
whatever she wanted to with a fetus since a fetus is part of the body. In view of
the controversy surrounding this issue, such a conclusion is unlikely, but is used
for purposes of illustration.
The controversy surrounding organ donation was recognized nationally.
A couple who gave birth to an infant without a fully developed brain wanted to
have the child declared brain-dead, so that her' organs could be used for
transplantation to other infants. The Florida Supreme Court refused to hear the
case, citing constitutional matters. The child died shortly thereafter, once her lifesupport equipment was disconnected. Baby Without Viable Brain Dies, But Legal
Struggle Will Continue, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1992 at A15.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 496.
See Wells, supra note 58, at 379.

See supranotes 21, 170. See also Moore, 793 P.2d at 506 n.5. The Act provides
for donation of entire human bodies, or human organs, after the death of the
donor; the understanding is that the donation of the body or organ is a gift.
I7 National Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 273-275 (West Supp.
1990). § 274e(a) provides that "[iut shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration
for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce." The
penalty for violation of the statute is a fine not to exceed $50,000 or five years
imprisonment, or both. Id.
27
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biotechnology.'
It attempts to balance the policy concerns of
preventing a patentee from receiving a windfall of profits with
preventing a patient from resenting that a profitable product has
been developed from tissue that had been donated.' 3 The
advantages of such a statute would include eliminating negotiations
at the time of donation or later on if a product is developed and
patented.'4 Since the donation would be considered a gift, it
would also eliminate problems locating the donor or the donor's
heirs at a later date and
hopefully, avoid conflict of interest problems
275
with the researcher.

The second part of the proposed legislation is a revision of
patent laws, where "[a] substantial portion of royalties that result
from patenting biotechnologically manipulated human cells" would
be returned to "government-funded biotechnology research."' The
rationale behind this section is to "perpetuat[e] the spirit of public
service that motivates many body part gifts."'
Several questions
remain unanswered by the proposed legislation. Since "governmentfunded biotechnology research" 278 is a broad concept, proceeds
could go to laboratories at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) or
any one of the university laboratories that receive NIH funding for
biotechnology and related research, or certain small corporations that
See Wells, supra note 58, at 379.
IId. According to Wells' proposal,
Consent would be fully informed under the following
guidelines:
* the donor should be informed that his/her donation may be
used in biotechnology research, possibly for commercial
purposes;
* the donor should be informed that his/her donation must be
given as a gift (unpaid), and that once donated, the donor
relinquishes all interest in the body part;
* the donor must be clearly informed that he/she is completely
free to refuse to donate or withdraw consent until the body part
is physically released to the initial recipient;
* the donor should be allowed a short waiting period between
agreeing to donate and signing a witnessed consent form,
coincidental with actually releasing the body part.

Id.
24

Id. at 379-80.

' See Wells, supra note 58, at 379-80.
id.

276
27

id.

2 Id.
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are also funded by NIH. Alternatively, the proceeds could go
directly into the United States Treasury as part of the government's
general revenue, in a manner similar to taxes.
Congress could also amend the National Organ
Transplantation Act (N.O.T.A.)' to extend its prohibitions to the
Dillon's
sale of organs or tissue used in biotechnology research.'
proposed amendment, however, only provided for amending the
statute's definition of "human organ."8" The N.O.T.A.'s current
definition of "human organ" includes fetal tissues; 2 the proposed
amendment tries to prevent a source of tissue from being
compensated, but, in actuality, weakens the current N.O.T.A. section
and does not even accomplish its purported purpose. 3
Another commentator has stated that if claims such as
Moore's are allowed, it could have a chilling effect on valuable
Danforth raises questions concerning
biomedical research.'
informed consent, professional medical standards, common law and
privacy interests, property interests, and the role of the patent
system.
She notes possible legislative choices: waiver of the
patient's claim to any profits, no regulation at all leaving the
individual parties to fend for themselves in a free-market system, or
The disadvantage of waiver is the
a profit-sharing proposal.'
potential coercive effects of a physician demanding a waiver; the
patient could assume that the provision of medical care would be
contingent upon consent.'8 7 The free-market system would create

z"National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984).
Dillon, Note, supra note 31, at 643.
2"Id. at 644.
2 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(c)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
' Dillon, Note, supra note 31, at 642-44. Its definition of "human organ" deletes
the term "including fetal" that is in the current statute, and makes an exclusion only
for human sperm and blood "[w]hen not used in biotechnical experimentation or
research." Id. at 644.
Danforth, supra note 178, at 181.
Id. at 181-82. Danforth's article was published prior to the Court of Appeal's
decision in Moore, and it concluded that under a traditional informed consent
doctrine, Moore's case would fail. Id. at 184.
286Id.
28

at 198.

Id. However, if the waiver were solicited in a federally-funded institution,

such a solicitation would be a violation of the Government's rules involving the
protection of human subjects. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(8) ("[Plarticipation is
voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which
the subject is otherwise entitled ....").
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the need to negotiate on each "transaction;" it is unlikely to be armslength bargaining.' She suggests that a profit-sharing proposal is
the most feasible solution. 9 Under such a system, both the patient
and the patentee/developer would receive a share of the
proceeds.'
This would be a two-stage process. 1 The patient
would give his or her informed consent at the time the body part
was obtained and would then receive medical treatment without
threats of coercion. 2 Only later, when the possible commercial
value of the body part is realized, would negotiations for licensing
commence; the rate of compensation would be fixed by an outside
body, such as by the legislature, with possible input from the
American Medical Association.'
Ultimately, these problems should be resolved by federal
legislation. Working guidelines could be drawn up at a conference
involving attorneys, ethicists, scientists who are actively working in
this area, and NIH personnel.2' The objective of such a conference
would be to prepare a set of working guidelines to resolve the
current situation.29 Another .alternative would be for Congress to
Danforth, supra note 178, at 199. Further, in view of the policy underlying
the U.A.G.A. and N.O.T.A., such a free market system would probably be against
federal policy concerning the sale of organs and other body parts.
2 Id. at 198.
m Id.
2

m

Id.

29

Id.

Id. Traynor, supra note 121, at 241-43, criticized this approach because one
or more of the parties are still being unjustly enriched. He proposed that any
sharing, whether of profits or proceeds, should be agreed upon before treatment,
and, in view of the value of diseased tissue, that this should be a minimal payment.
Id. at 244.
2 See Stanley Cohen, Recombinant DNA: Fact and Fiction, 195 SCIENCE 654 (1977).
Scientists who were involved in recombinant DNA research in the early 1970's met
to develop proposals that were the forerunners to the NIH Guidelines for
Recombinant DNA Research. See 41 Fed. Reg. 38426 (1976) (text of original NIH
Guidelines; many of its stringent conditions have subsequently been relaxed as
fears of the drafters failed to materialize). The National Institutes of Health is the
largest supporter of biomedical research in this country.
' See Notices: Public Health Service - Open Meeting On Conflicts of Interest in
Clinical Evaluation of Commercial Products, 19 NIH GUIDE TO CONTRACTS AND
GRANTS (Nov. 2, 1990) at 1. NIH held a conference in November, 1990 to address
questions of conflicts of interest that have developed when researchers have had
financial interests in the biotechnology companies whose products they are testing.
Among the questions that were to be addressed were whether the investigator
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act directly and provide guidance for all parties.
Either approach should clarify the role of the scientist, the
physician-researcher, and more importantly the patient, such that
each party would know what he or she can expect when tissue is
removed and possibly developed into a product.2" There are many
potential issues that need legislative resolution. One issue is whether
the bodies of living and dead individuals should be treated
similarly.'
Adults should probably be treated differently from
minors because of informed consent issues, but additional guidelines
might need to be provided to protect disabled individuals.2'
Issues concerning the type of transaction that is involved and
whether different tissues should receive different treatment also need
to be resolved.'
The legislation should address whether
commerce would be allowed in whole bodies as well as component
tissues.'
It should also address precautions necessary to prevent
individuals from intentionally harming themselves in order to obtain
money." Any legislation should also establish whether the patient
would receive a percentage of the sales or profits from any product
developed and insure that neither party is unjustly enriched or
receives an unconscionable benefit. 2
The Moore opinion illustrates some of the weaknesses of the
should disclose their financial interests in the project when seeking a patient's
informed consent to participate in the study, and made an explicit reference to the
Moore decision. Id. The NIH sought opinions on possible remedies for violations,

and whether the financial interests of the institutions should be considered. Id.
Other issues that were to be addressed included policy matters, restrictions on
financial involvement, and proposals for remedies and sanctions. Id. The
proceedings of this conference will be used to guide NIH rulemaking in this area.
2 OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 115, notes that surgically removed tissue

usually has no value to the individual. The tissue was removed because it was
perceived as a threat. See also Bohrer, supra note 250, at 253.
297 RUSSELL Scowr, THE BODY As PROPERTY 253 (1981).
SId. at 254.
Id. Various bodily fluids, including urine, semen and blood are routinely
sold by living individuals. Id. at 190.
ooId.
" Dillon, Note, supra note 31, at 637. But see Hardiman, Note, supra note 267,
at 233 (arguing that compensation for tissue donation will actually increase the
supply of tissues for research and transplantation).
' Traynor, supra note 121, at 244-45.
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Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,' and these gaps should be closed.
For example, the definitional section defines an anatomical gift as a
donation that will take effect upon the death of the individual.'
Section 1(7) defines 'part' as "an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery,
blood, fluid, or other portion of a human body."'
This section
should be amended to include fetuses and abortuses.'
Section 10
is entitled "Sale or Purchase of Parts Prohibited."'
Subsection (a)
currently provides that "[a] person may not knowingly, for valuable
consideration, purchase or sell a part for transplantation or therapy,
if removal of the part is intended to occur after the death of the
decedent."'
This section should be amended as follows:
(a)(1) A person may not knowingly, for valuable
consideration, purchase or sell a part for transplantation or therapy,
or use in medical experimentation, or for research that will be used to
develop a product or similar commercial activity, if removal of the part
is intended to occur after the death of the decedent.
(a)(2) A person may not knowingly, for valuable
consideration, purchase or sell a part for transplantation or therapy,
or use in medical experimentation, or for research that will be used
to develop a product or similar commercial activity, if removal of the
part is intended to occur during the lifetime of the individual.
(b) Valuable consideration does not include reasonable
See supra notes 21, 170 and accompanying text. The Prefatory Note to the
original 1968 version of the U.A.G.A. noted that the nation had a need for tissues
and organs for use not only in transplantation, but for research and therapy. UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT,8A U.L.A., at 16 (West 1983). The legal issues raised from
the competing interests of individuals and the nation's need for organs and tissues
were inadequately addressed by current statutes. Id. at 17. The U.A.G.A. was
enacted to remedy this "statutory picture . . . of confusion, diversity and

inadequacy." Id.
See generally UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT,8A U.LA., at 2 (West Supp. 1990).
3 Id. at 8.
3 See Field, Note, supra note 267. The author suggested legislation to limit fetal
tissue research to "federally licensed and regulated nonprofit research
organizations," id. at 185, but this proposal, if implemented, could still lead to a
"black market" in fetal tissue, something repugnant to public policy. Id.
Interestingly, while officially there is a ban on fetal tissue research in the United
States, the federal government is still supporting fetal research with approximately
$7.3 million NIH funding in fetal tissue-related projects. B.J. Spalding, Fetal-Tissue
Research: Abortion Politics Slow Advances to a Crawl, 9 BIOTECHNOLOGY 615, 616

(1991).
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIwr ACT, 8A U.L.A., at 25 (West Supp. 1990).

3 Id.
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payment for the removal, processing, disposal, preservation, quality
control, storage, transplantation, or implantation of a part donatedfor
transplantation or therapy and that was removed after the death of a
decedent, pursuant to subsection (a).
No changes are proposed for subsection (c), where violation
of the statute is a felony carrying a fine not exceeding $50,000 or a
minimum of five years imprisonment, or both.'
VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There should be federal rules to establish ownership and
property rights that may exist regarding the human body. Congress
has enacted the National Organ Transplant Act,31 ° regarding the
ownership of organs that are used for organ transplants, and has
expressly prohibited the sale of organs or tissues used for
transplantation.1 1 Similarly, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act has
resolved other problems regarding organ donation.312 Moore has
shown that gaps remain in the U.A.G.A. which can be interpreted to
indicate that a living person has a property right in his or her organs
and tissues and a right to sell his or her tissues for profit.3 3 Moore
illustrates how a statute that is silent can be interpreted as
prohibiting the sale of organs or tissues by a living donor and
therefore used to deny a property right.3 4' The California Supreme
Court has stated that in California, there is no cause of action for
conversion of one's tissue.15 The court also stated, in effect, that
the outcome of this suit, or others like it in the future, might be
effected by the presence of biotechnology companies in that
309 Id. (emphasis represents author's suggested amendments).
31042

U.S.C.A. § 273-275 (West 1990).
31 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT, 8A U.L.A. § 10, at 25 (West Supp. 1990)
312The Prefatory Note to the 1987 revision of the U.A.G.A. states that the
revisions were designed, in part, to facilitate the making of an anatomical gift by
an individual, and to protect organizations that are involved in organ procurement.
See UNiF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT, 8A U.L.A., at 24 (West Supp. 1990).
313 The COMMENT to Sect. 10 of the U.A.G.A. explicitly states that this section
"does not cover the sale by living donors if removal is intended to occur before
death." Id. at 25.
31 This was the dispute of the various Justices in Moore. See generallyMoore v.
Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479,479-523 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
315 Id. at 497.
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particular state.316 Commentators have agreed that not only did the
court rule in favor of the biotechnology industry,317 but since
Moore's complaint was well-pleaded, the court should have allowed
the cause of action for conversion to be remanded to the trial court
for findings of fact.318 The California Supreme Court historically
has made many inroads in tort law,319 and there is no doubt that
its opinion will be persuasive in courts of many states. Nevertheless,
should suits similar to Moore be filed in other states, the national
outcome could still be a patchwork of varied decisions. Since Moore
won't be resolved for several years, and considering all the issues
and public policy matters involved, federal action to grant a clear
property right or to deny any property rights in human tissue and
organs used for research and commercial development will be the
only effective way to resolve this question nationally.
Benjamin Appelbaum
316 In Moore, the California Supreme Court took a pragmatic approach to the
problem. Moore, 793 P.2d at 486. California has a number of major biotechnology
companies, such as Amgen, Chiron and Genentech. The outcome, perhaps, might
be quite different in a state that had no or only a few small such companies. See
generally Biotechnology Guide, supra note 23.
37 See Annas, Blinded, supra note 192, at 247-48; Shaffer, supra note 248, at 261;
Traynor, supra note 121, at 241; Weber, supra note 219, at 267-68.
318 See Annas, Blinded, supra note 192, at 247, Bohrer, supra note 250, at 252-53,
Weber, supra note 219, at 268-69. See also Chandler & Olson, The Battle Over
Ownership of Cell Lines: Wvhy a Source's Right to Compensation Should be Limited, 8

BIOTECHNOLOCY L. REP. 257-58 (1990).
319 Blum, supra note 103.

